It is an open problem whether a classical client (verifier) can delegate quantum computing to a remote quantum server (prover) in such a way that the correctness of quantum computing is somehow guaranteed. We show that such a delegation is possible if the prover is rational. More precisely, we introduce the following protocol. The BQP prover first sends the BPP verifier a single bit allegedly equal to the solution of the BQP decision problem that the verifier wants to solve. The verifier then gives the prover a reward whose amount is determined by the bit sent from the prover and some random numbers the verifier samples from certain probability distributions. The reward function is constructed in such a way that the rational prover, who wants to maximize the expected profit, has to send the correct bit to the verifier.
It is an open problem whether a classical client (verifier) can delegate quantum computing to a remote quantum server (prover) in such a way that the correctness of quantum computing is somehow guaranteed. We show that such a delegation is possible if the prover is rational. More precisely, we introduce the following protocol. The BQP prover first sends the BPP verifier a single bit allegedly equal to the solution of the BQP decision problem that the verifier wants to solve. The verifier then gives the prover a reward whose amount is determined by the bit sent from the prover and some random numbers the verifier samples from certain probability distributions. The reward function is constructed in such a way that the rational prover, who wants to maximize the expected profit, has to send the correct bit to the verifier.
One of the most important open problems in quantum physics and quantum computing is the possibility of classically verifying quantum computing [1] [2] [3] . In the computational complexity term, "Does the class BQP have an interactive proof system with a BQP prover and a BPP verifier?" [4] This fundamental question nowadays has a practical significance with the advent of cloud quantum computing.
There are five different types of approaches to the open problem. First, if the verifier is allowed to be "slightly quantum", any BQP problem can be verified with a BQP prover. For example, verification protocols of Refs. [5, 6] and verifiable blind quantum computing protocols [3, [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] assume some minimum quantum technologies for the verifier, such as small quantum memories, single-qubit state generations, or single-qubit measurements.
Second, if multiple entangling BQP provers who are not communicating with each other are allowed, any BQP problem is verified with a BPP verifier [18] [19] [20] .
Third, several specific problems in BQP have been shown to be classically verifiable. For example, Simon's problem [21] and factoring [22] are trivially classically verifiable. Furthermore, the recursive Fourier sampling [23] has a poly-round-message interactive proof system with a BQP prover and a BPP verifier [24] . Certain promise problems regarding the output probability distributions of quantum circuits in the second level of the Fourier hierarchy [25] have single-message Merlin-Arthur protocols with BQP Merlin [26, 27] .
Fourth, since BQP is contained in PSPACE = IP, a natural approach to the open problem is to reduce the computational power of the prover of IP from #P to BQP when the problem is in BQP. For example, if we directly apply the sum check protocol to the verification of the value of the acceptance probability of a BQP circuit, the prover needs #P power, but it might be possible to modify the sum check protocol so that a BQP prover is enough. Ref. [28] gave an important step in this direction. They constructed a poly-round-message interactive proof system that verifies the value of the trace of operators with a postBQP prover and a BPP verifier.
Finally, a recent innovative work has shown that a classical verification of quantum computing is indeed possible with the assumption that the learning with errors problem is hard for quantum computing [29] .
In this paper, we take a new approach different from these previous works. We consider an interactive proof system with a rational prover. The idea of interactive proof systems with a rational prover was first introduced by Azar and Micali [30] . In the simplest form of such systems, namely the single-message rational Merlin-Arthur system, the prover sends a message to the verifier, and the verifier gives the prover a reward. The amount of the reward is determined by prover's message and random numbers the verifier samples from certain probability distributions. The prover is neither honest nor malicious, but just rational: he/she behaves in such a way that the expected profit becomes maximum. If the reward function is appropriately constructed, the rational prover, who wants to maximize the expected profit, has to send the correct message to the verifier. In other words, the verifier no longer verifies, but just relies on the prover's rationality. The authors of Ref. [30] showed that this single-message rational Merlin-Arthur system can solve #P problems. (Although it is not necessary to understand their results in order to understand our results, we provide a summary of some of their results in Appendix A because they are elegant and insightful, and therefore we think such a summary is useful for readers.)
We consider the rational prover in delegated quan-tum computing, and show that any BQP problem can be solved with a rational BQP prover and a BPP verifier. Our protocol is the single-round Merlin-Arthur type, namely, only a single message from the prover to the verifier is enough. Moreover, in our protocol, the size of the message sent from the prover to the verifier is only a single bit, which is allegedly equal to the solution of the BQP decision problem that the verifier wants to solve. To our best knowledge, it is the first time that the concept of the rational proof systems is applied to quantum computing. We believe that the concept of the rational proof systems will also be useful in more other areas of quantum cryptography than delegated quantum computing.
Setups.-Before introducing our protocol, we need some setups. Let L be a language in BQP. It means that for any polynomial r there exists a uniform family {V x } x of polynomial-size quantum circuits such that if
is the acceptance probability of V x . Here n = poly(|x|), |0 n ≡ |0 ⊗n , and I ≡ |0 0| + |1 1| is the twodimensional identity operator. Without loss of generality, we can assume that V x consists of only classical gates (such as X, CN OT , Toffoli, etc.) and Hadamard gates [31, 32] . (Similar arguments are possible for other universal gate sets, such as the Clifford plus T ≡ Z 1 4 universal gate set. See Appendix B.) From V x , we construct the circuit W x acting on n + 1 qubits as shown in Fig. 1 . Note that W x also consists of only classical gates and Hadamard gates. It is easy to check that
The circuit Wx. The slash (/) means multiple qubits (in this case, n − 1 qubits).
Let t be the number of elementary gates in W x . In other words, W x = u t ...u 1 , where u i (i = 1, 2, ..., t) is a classical gate or the Hadamard gate. We consider the following t-step non-deterministic (classical) computing:
1. The state of the register is represented by the pair (z, c) of an (n + 1)-bit string z ≡ (z 1 , ..., z n+1 ) ∈ {0, 1} n+1 and a single bit c ∈ {0, 1}. The initial state of the register is (z = 0 n+1 , c = 0).
2. For i = 1, 2, ..., t, do the following:
2-a. If u i is a classical gate, update the register as (z, c) → (u i (z), c).
2-b.
If u i is the Hadamard gate acting on jth qubit, do the following non-deterministic transition:
An example of the non-deterministic computing for n = 2, t = 4, and Fig. 2 .
An example of the non-deterministic computing.
It is easy to check that
where h is the number of Hadamard gates in W x , A is the number of non-deterministic paths ending at (z = 0 n+1 , c = 0), and R is the number of non-deterministic paths ending at (z = 0 n+1 , c = 1). (In the example of Fig. 2 , A = 1 and R = 0.) Therefore, from Eqs. (1), (2), and (3), we obtain
can be sampled in probabilistic classical polynomial time by doing the following procedure:
1. Choose a single path from all 2 h paths uniformly at random.
2. Do the classical deterministic polynomial time computing along with the chosen path. If the path is the one ending at (z = 0 n+1 , c = 0), output w = 1. If the path is the one ending at (z = 0 n+1 , c = 1), output w = 2. Otherwise, output w = 3.
Our protocol.-Now we introduce our protocol, which runs as follows:
1. The prover sends the verifier a single bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
If the prover is honest, b = 1 when x ∈ L, and b = 0 when x / ∈ L.
2. The verifier samples s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} uniformly at random. The verifier also samples w ∈ {1, 2, 3} from the probability distribution of D given in Eq. (4). The verifier gives the prover the reward $ whose amount is determined according to the following rule:
-If s = 2 and w = 2, then $ = −5 √ 2 h b.
-Otherwise, $ = 0.
Here, $ < 0 means that the prover has to pay to the verifier.
The expectation value $ b of prover's reward when the prover sends b ∈ {0, 1} to the verifier is
and therefore the rational prover sends
and therefore the rational prover sends b = 0. In this way, by taking a sufficiently large r, the rational prover who wants to maximize the expected profit has to send the correct bit, i.e., b = 1 when x ∈ L and b = 0 when x / ∈ L. Generalization to other classes.-Our result can be generalized to other classes than BQP. For example, we here construct a protocol for any AWPP problem with a rational AWPP prover and a BPP verifier. (The generalization to SBQP is given in Appendix C. The generalizations to QMA and QCMA are given in Appendix D. The generalization to C = P is given in Appendix E.) AWPP is a (classical) complexity class known to be the best upperbound of BQP [34] . It is also known that the computational power of the generalized probabilistic theory that contains quantum physics as a special case is equal to AWPP [35] .
Let us assume that a language L is in AWPP. It means that for any polynomial r there exist a GapP function g and a polynomial q such that if
2 q ≤ 2 −r . Let M be the non-deterministic Turing machine corresponding to g. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the computational tree of M is a binary tree. The lengths of paths of M are not necessarily the same, but we can always construct a non-deterministic Turing machine N whose all paths have the same length such that g(x) = 1 2 (A(x) − R(x)), where A(x) and R(x) are the numbers of accepting and rejecting paths of N , respectively [36] .
Our protocol runs as follows:
1. The prover sends the verifier b ∈ {0, 1}. If the prover is honest, b = 1 when x ∈ L, and b = 0 when x / ∈ L.
2. The verifier simulates N probabilistically, which means that, when he/she arrives at a nondeterministic transition point, he/she chooses one branch by flipping a fair coin. If the result of the computing is accept, output a = 0. If reject, output a = 1. The verifier samples s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} uniformly at random. The verifier gives the prover the reward $ whose amount is determined by the following rule:
-If s = 1 and a = 0, then $ = -Otherwise, $ = 0.
Here, t is the number of non-deterministic transitions that a single path of N experiences.
The expectation value of prover's reward when the prover sends b to the verifier is
Note that our protocol is zero-knowledge because the prover sends the verifier only the solution, x ∈ L or x / ∈ L, and the verifier gains no extra information other than that.
Our protocol does not require any extra computational overhead for the prover. For example, in the verification protocols of Refs. [8, 9] , some extra trap qubits are needed, and in the verification protocols of Refs. [5] [6] [7] , the prover has to generate the Feynman-Kitaev history state
where V x = v k ...v 1 , which is more complicated than the mere output state, V x |0 n , of the quantum computation. On the other hand, in our protocol, what the prover has to do is only the original quantum computing that the verifier would do if the verifier had his/her own quantum computer.
Our protocol neither generates any extra communication overhead between the prover and the verifier. In the verification protocols of Refs. [8, 9] , polynomially many bits have to be exchanged between the prover and the verifier in order to verify that the prover did the correct measurements on trap qubits. In the verification protocols of Refs. [5] [6] [7] , the prover has to send the verifier a Feynman-Kitaev history state, which consists of polynomially many qubits. On the other hand, in our protocol, what the prover has to send to the verifier is only a single classical bit that encodes the solution of the BQP decision problem that the verifier wants to solve.
In our protocol, |$| can be O( √ 2 h ), i.e., an exponentially increasing function of h, which might cause the verifier's bankruptcy. Unfortunately, we can show that if we require the gap ∆ ≡ | $ b=1 − $ b=0 | has an 1/poly gap, i.e., ∆ ≥ 1/poly, such an exponential increase of |$| is unavoidable unless BQP = BPP. In fact, let D be the probability distribution that the verifier samples, and $(w, b) be the reward given to the prover when the prover sends b ∈ {0, 1} to the verifier and the verifier samples w from D. Then the expectation value of the prover's reward when the prover sends b ∈ {0, 1} to the verifier is
If |$(w, b)| ≤ poly for any w and b, the BPP verifier can estimate the value of $ b within a 1/poly precision by using the standard Chernoff bound argument. In fact, let w 1 , w 2 , ..., w T be the random numbers sampled from
, is an ǫ precision estimator of $ b due to the Chernoff bound: Appendix A. Here we briefly summarize some of results in Ref. [30] . To understand the essence, let us consider the following protocol:
1. The verifier samples w from a probability distribution D.
2. The prover sends the verifier the description of a probability distribution D ′ .
3. The verifier gives the prover the reward S(D ′ , w). [33] . In the above protocol, prover's expected profit is w D(w)S(D ′ , w). By the straightforward calculation,
Therefore, prover's expected profit is maximum when D ′ = D. In other words, if the prover wants to maximize the expected profit, he/she has to send
The point is that this protocol enables the verifier, who can sample from D but does not know the description of D, to learn the description of D from the rational prover.
In Ref. [30] , this idea was used to construct a rational Merlin-Arthur system for #P problems. Let
be a Boolean function that can be calculated in classical polynomial time. The verifier first samples an n-bit string x ∈ {0, 1} n uniformly at random. He/She then outputs φ(x). The probability that the verifier outputs 0 is #φ 2 n , where #φ is the number of x ∈ {0, 1} n such that φ(x) = 0. In other words, the verifier can sample from the probability distribution 
Let us consider the following t-step non-deterministic computing:
1. The state of the register is represented by (p, c, k) , where p represents the tensor product of n Pauli operators, c ∈ {+1, −1} represents the sign, and k is an integer that counts the number of nondeterministic transitions experienced. The initial state of the register is (p = Z ⊗ I ⊗n−1 , c = +1, k = 0).
2. For i = 1, 2, ..., t, do the following: 2-a. If u i is a Clifford gate g, update the register
2-b. If u i is T gate acting on jth qubit, and if jth Pauli operator of p is Z, do nothing on the register.
2-c. If u i is T gate acting on jth qubit, and if jth Pauli operator of p is X, do the following nondeterministic transition:
2-d. If u i is T gate acting on jth qubit, and if jth
Pauli operator of p is Y , do the following nondeterministic transition:
An example for n = 3, t = 6, and
is given in Fig. 3 . For simplicity, the symbol ⊗ is omitted, i.e., Z ⊗ I ⊗ I is written as ZII, for example.
where the summation is taken over all paths, (p i , c i , k i ) is the final state of the register corresponding to the path i, and
consists of only Z and I, 0 otherwise.
2. The verifier simulates the non-deterministic computing probabilistically, which means that, when he/she arrives at a non-deterministic transition point, he/she chooses one branch by flipping a fair coin. Let (p i , c i , k i ) be the final state of the probabilistic computing. The verifier flips a fair coin s ∈ {0, 1}. The verifier gives the prover the reward
Therefore, the rational prover sends b = 1 when x ∈ L and b = 0 when x / ∈ L. Appendix C. In this section, we construct a protocol for any SBQP problem with an SBQP rational prover and a BPP verifier. Let L be a language in SBQP. It means that there exist a polynomial r and a uniformly generated family {V x } x of polynomial size quantum circuits such that if x ∈ L then p acc ≥ 
Our protocol is the same as that for the BQP case, but the amount of the reward is multiplied by 2 r if s ∈ {1, 2, 4, 5}. Then, the expectation value of prover's reward when the prover sends b ∈ {0, 1} to the verifier is
When x / ∈ L,
Appendix D. In this section, we construct a protocol for any QMA (or QCMA) problem with a rational QMA (or QCMA) prover and a BPP verifier.
We consider QMA. The construction for QCMA is similar. Let L be a language in QMA. It means that for any polynomial r there exists a uniformly generated family {V x } x of polynomial size quantum circuits such that if x ∈ L then there exists an m-qubit pure state |ψ such that p acc (|ψ ) ≥ 1 − 2 −r , and if x / ∈ L then for any m-qubit state ρ, p acc (ρ) ≤ 2 −r , where
If we define W x in the same way as we have done in the BQP case,
is satisfied for any pure state |ψ . Without loss of generality, we assume that V x (and therefore W x ) uses only classical and Hadamard gates. We consider the non-deterministic computing that simulates W x as we have done in the BQP case. However, in this case, the initial state is (z = y0 n , c = 0), where y ∈ {0, 1} m is an m-bit string. It is easy to check
where h is the number of Hadamard gates in W x , A y is the number of paths ending at (z = y0 n , c = 0), and R y is the number of paths ending at (z = y0 n , c = 1). Let us define the probability distribution
The probability distribution can be sampled in probabilistic classical polynomial time.
1. The prover sends the verifier a single bit b ∈ {0, 1}. If the prover is honest, b = 1 when x ∈ L, and b = 0 when x / ∈ L.
2. The verifier samples s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and y ∈ {0, 1} m uniformly at random. The verifier also samples w ∈ {1, 2, 3} from the probability distribution D y . The verifier gives the prover the reward $ whose amount is determined according to the following rule:
-If s = 2 and w = 2, then $ = −5 √ 2 h 2 m b.
-If s = 3, then $ = 5(1 − b).
-If s = 4 and w = 1, then $ = −5 √ 2 h 2 m (1 − b).
-If s = 5 and w = 2, then $ = 5 √ 2 h 2 m (1 − b).
Then, the expectation value of prover's reward when the prover sends b ∈ {0, 1} to the verifier is
It is known that r can be arbitrary large while fixing m [37] . Appendix E. In this paper, we construct a protocol for any C = P problem with a rational C = P prover and a BPP verifier.
Let us assume that a language L is in C = P. It means that there exists a GapP function g such that if x ∈ L then g(x) = 0, and if x / ∈ L then g(x) = 0. Let M be the non-deterministic Turing machine corresponding to g. The lengths of paths of M are not necessarily the same, but we can always construct a non-deterministic Turing machine N whose all paths have the same length t and
where A and R are the numbers of accepting and rejecting paths of N , respectively. If x ∈ L then A − R = 0, and if x / ∈ L then |A − R| ≥ 2. Our protocol runs as follows:
2. The verifier samples s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8} uniformly at random. The verifier also samples w 1 , w 2 ∈ {1, 2, 3} from D, where
The verifier gives the prover the reward $ whose amount is determined by the following rule:
-If s = 1, then $ = 16b.
-If (s = 2, w 1 = 1, w 2 = 1), then $ = −4 t+1 b.
-If (s = 3, w 1 = 1, w 2 = 2), then $ = 2 × 4 t+1 b.
-If (s = 4, w 1 = 2, w 2 = 2), then $ = −4 t+1 b.
-If s = 5, then $ = 8(1 − b).
-If (s = 6, w 1 = 1, w 2 = 1), then $ = −4(1 − b).
-If (s = 7, w 1 = 1, w 2 = 2), then $ = 8(1 − b).
-If (s = 8, w 1 = 2, w 2 = 2), then $ = −4(1 − b).
